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The Fukushima accident is the largest nuclear power plant accident caused by a natural disaster, 
which shut off the cooling system. In this accident, an initiating event from a single unit was 
propagated to other units at the site. Prior to the Fukushima accident, scenarios for multi-unit 
failures had been screened out, so that only single unit failure scenarios were taken into account 
in the nuclear industry. Since that accident, the nuclear industry in South Korea is now more 
concerned with multi-unit Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and is attempting to develop a 
new methodology since there are generally more than four units on one site in the country 
The chemical and petrochemical industries have experienced a number of incidents/accidents 
related to multi-units such as vessels and tanks because many of these units are usually installed 
on a site. The chemical industry has a wide range of experience, but most scenarios have 
involved domino effects, while the study of multi-vessel accidents caused by natural disasters 
(i.e., earthquakes) is lacking. The purpose of this paper is to review past experiences in the 
chemical industry and adapt appropriate process safety applications using risk analysis related to 
multiple vessels (tanks) at a site. Several QRA approaches have been searched and employed to 
compare the risks of some chemical plant complexes in South Korea regarding multi-vessel (unit) 
failure scenarios due to natural disasters. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Fukushima Daiichi accident has had a significant impact on the nuclear industry and was the 
third core damage accident to occur since the birth of commercial nuclear power. The major 
difference compared with other severe accidents was the fact that the initiating event from a 
single unit was propagated to other multiple units. A series of critical events had to be dealt with 
simultaneously, and each event was tied to the previous events. A so-called domino effect was 
clearly shown when the nearly completed and temporarily installed ad hoc external power line to 
#2 unit was damaged by a hydrogen explosion of the neighboring #1 unit owing to the 
dissociation of zirconium. This damage resulted in a delay in activating the emergency responses 
required to cope with the problems at hand.  
 Existing probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) models have screened out multiple unit 
accidents due to their extremely low frequency, and have focused solely on single-unit events. In 
fact, a large number of nuclear sites have more than two units. In South Korea, there are up to ten 
units at the same site. As observed in the Fukushima case, a multi-unit accident has a higher 
amount of risk and requires a multi-unit related PSA framework for a risk assessment, which 
requires properly addressing the technical issues. Starting from 1978, operating plants in Korea 
have been located in four different sites, Kori, Hanbit, Hanul, and Wolseong, and a few multi-
plant events have occurred, as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Event list of multiple plants in Korea 
Plant Year  Category Overview of Accident  
Kori 
1-4 1987 
Loop (Loss of 
Off-site Power) 
due to external 
event 
Typhoon Thelma caused disturbances in the transmission 
systems and let solid waste into the intakes. The nuclear 
reactors were consequently stopped.  
Kori 
1-4 2003 
Loop due to 
external event 
Typhoon Maemi damaged transmission lines. Protective 
relays of the plants were operated to the stop nuclear 
reactors.  
Hanul 
1 & 2 1997 LOOP 
During normal operation under full power, heavy snow and 
strong winds in the Yeongdong area forced transmission 
lines between Uljin and Donghae to gradually undergo 
ground faults. 
Hanul 




(Loss of Ultimate 
Heat Sink) 
During normal output operation, a large amount of marine 
organisms were flown into the intakes, which settled on the 
surface of the drum screens. Differential pressure signals 
ordered auto-stops to the circulating water pumps.  
 
As previously described, it is thought that the risk of a multi-unit plant accident caused by the 
dependencies among the different units is small based on the design characteristics of domestic 
Korean nuclear power plants. The two initiating events selected from the case study analysis also 
occurred from external factors rather than through a randomness of the systems; in addition, 
event cases of a reactor shutdown caused by a typhoon also exist. Therefore, in the case of Korea, 
the analysis should be focused on events caused by external hazards (e.g., an earthquake, a 
tsunami, a super typhoon, strong winds, or rainfall). 
On the other hand, a chemical plant is an industrial process plant producing chemicals at a large 
scale. Chemical plants have specifications of a relatively complex control system and store large 
amounts of chemicals that can cause an incident, including fires, explosions, and toxic releases. 
More importantly, chemical plants have multiple vessels that may hold reactive, flammable, 
and/or toxic materials. We understand that differences between a nuclear reactor and a chemical 
reactor exist. A chemical reactor is usually made up of a single wall of stainless steel and is 
significantly smaller than a nuclear reactor. Although accident prevention in a chemical plant is 
important, consequence analyses in chemical plants have been focused upon more than in the 
nuclear industry. For instance, a propagation of incidents resulting in one vessel exploding 
followed by another vessel exploding is a typical occurrence in a chemical plant and has been 
deeply researched; however, it is difficult to think of the same type of domino effect occurring 
between nuclear reactors owing to their individual strengths. Nonetheless, we have searched 
through many different incidents and risk assessment methodologies of the chemical industry, 
which have experienced a number of incidents/accidents related to multiple units such as 
multiple vessels and tanks because many such units are often installed at a single site. Accidents 
caused by a natural disaster such as an earthquake are a major concern in the chemical industry 
as well. As shown in Table 2, representative cases of multi-unit accidents occurring in chemical 
plants after an earthquake and a subsequent domino effect do exist. Four such accidents were 
caused from earthquakes and two other incidents were caused solely through a domino effect 
after the initial explosions. 








1964 7.5 5 Earthquake and domino effect  
Miyagi 
(Japan) 
1978 7.7 3 Earthquake, 14 tanks with minor damage 
Izmit 
(Turkey) 




2003 8.3 29 Earthquake 
Mexico city 
(Mexico) 
1984 N/A 6 large 




2005 N/A 20 Domino effect 
 
Because substantial accidents from such events have actually occurred, the study of accident 
cases and risk assessments regarding earthquakes and a subsequent domino effect for multi-
vessel failures in the chemical industry is very important. For this paper, risk assessment 
methodologies were reviewed to determine what if anything there is to learn from such an 
endeavor, and a QRA study addressing such methodologies was finally conducted.  
In the chemical plant industry, accidents caused by earthquakes are important because they can 
lead to a domino effect. The combination of an earthquake and a subsequent domino effect has 
been an issue, and a few researchers have suggested how to integrate such events. A domino 
event is defined as an event within a chain of events (accident scenarios) that contributes to the 
domino effect. An incident escalation is a process promoting the degradation of any property as 
well as injury to people during the development of the domino effect, which tends to increase the 
amount of damage. Therefore, any event spreading from the equipment, from one industrial unit 
to another, or from one site to another, should be classified as a domino event. To combine an 
earthquake and subsequent domino effect within a risk assessment, the initial incident frequency 
caused by the earthquake should be obtained. Salzano et al. investigated how to calculate the 
probability of a vessel rupture or damage from the peak ground acceleration (PGA) depending on 
the types of vessels. The group used a historical earthquake frequency with the PGA within a 
particular province, and obtained the rupture frequency. Once the initial frequency was obtained, 
the next step was to determine how to properly add the frequency and consequences from the 
domino effect. It is clear that an accident with a domino effect is very complex and that the chain 
of events can take on various forms. Fig. 1 shows the complexity of a domino effect.  
The dark arrows indicate that the propagation to a secondary unit can be influenced by both the 
escalation vector from the primary event, and from another secondary event. Also, it is defined 
that two main features for escalation of domino accident characteristics: direct escalation, 
indirect escalation. A direct escalation is caused by an immediate exposure of radiation, 
overpressure, or a fragment projection following an initiating event, which in turn may lead to a 
secondary accident.  
 
Fig. 1. Principle structures in a chain of accidents (courtesy for reproduced from Loof. et al.) 
An indirect escalation can be defined as an escalation of a primary event in which the secondary 
scenarios are not caused by direct damage to the equipment such as in a direct escalation. Loss of 
control through the loss of communication, inadequate access to emergency locations from road 
damage, and damage to structures (support structures or warehouses) can be identified as the 
most likely mechanisms. 
In this paper, only a direct escalation is considered for a QRA study on an LPG site where 11 
storage tanks are located in the same proximity. Due to sensitivity regarding N numbers of 
calculated FN curves in the city under investigation, the name of the location and the exact N 
numbers are all hidden.  
2. Methodology 
This study aims to combine an earthquake with the subsequent domino effect to see the 
increment of consequence as well as frequency through a safety analysis. Several QRA 
approaches applied to the chemical industry have been searched through and employed to 
compare the risks of certain chemical plant complexes in South Korea regarding multi-vessel 
(unit) failure scenarios from seismic events. The suggested approach consists of the following 
steps: 







For #1, a pervious QRA study was adopted to develop QRA studies on seismic events and their 
subsequent domino effect. A previous QRA study was conducted for 11 real LPG tanks, as 
shown in Fig 2. The descriptions of each tank and their rupture frequencies are illustrated in 
Table 4.  
 
 











It is important to select the original QRA study 
carefully because the latter works compare the results with the original QRAs, which do not 
consider seismic events or a domino effect. The original QRA study assumed as its accident 
scenarios the catastrophic ruptures of 11 tanks with 8,100 people present in the surrounding city, 
#1. Risk assessment without considering the seismic event and domino effect 
#2. Identification of reference scenarios for the PGA 
#3. Estimation of accident frequency for a given PGA 
#4. Frequency calculation for each combination 








1–9 Propane 645 1.00E-6 
10 Butane 1,116 1.00E-6 
11 Butane 2,232 1.00E-6 
Fig. 2. Layout of 11 tanks  
as shown in Fig. 3. This population is evenly distributed throughout the city, as shown in the 
figure. The original study did not take any preventions or mitigations into account, and the 
resulting FN curve was reproduced using Phast-Risk 6.7, as shown in Fig. 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4. FN curve for the original QRA study 
 
 
According to a previous study, several thousand people will lose their lives, with an accumulated 
frequency of 1.1 x 10-5/year when assuming that each of the 11 tanks has a 10-6/year rupture 
frequency under this catastrophic scenario.  
 
To address procedures #2 and #3 in Table 3, the PGA was considered as the ground motion 
intensity measure owing to the nature of the damage database used. Other researchers have 
worked on a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and a vulnerability review, which are 
described in the following section.  
Cozzani et al. produced probit equations on the PGA value for each type of tank. In this study, 
only pressurized vessels are included in the scenario, and the third equation in Table 5 is mainly 
used.  
Table 5. Probit equations for equipment with seismic fragility (courtesy reproduced from 
Cozzani et al., 2006) 
Scenario Target Probit equation Dose, D 
Seismic event Atmosph.. Storage unanchored Y = -0.833 + 1.25ln(D) PGA 
Seismic event Atmosph.. Storage anchored  Y = -2.43 + 1.54ln(D) PGA 
Seismic event Pressurized Storage, any Y = 5.146 + 0.884ln(D) PGA 
 
For the location, PGA data were previously suggested in Choi et al., and are directly used in this 
paper, as shown in Fig 5.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Population polygon of the nearby city 
area with the 11 tanks in the center 
 
Fig. 5. Annual exceedance probability for PGA at the province (courtesy copied from Choi et al.)  
 
For procedure #4, the arbitrary probability of an event propagating to the next tank is assumed to 
be 30%, which assumes that each catastrophic rupture has an immediate ignition (/BLEVE) 
probability of 30% based on a general event tree analysis. The remaining 70% probability is 
assumed to be dispersion followed by a flash fire. Fig. 6 describes how a failure starting from 
tank #1 can propagate to the next immediate tanks (#2, #4, and #10). In the second domino effect, 
tanks #2, #4, and #10 are again included if they have not failed from the explosion from the first 
domino effect. This example only shows the domino effect from the failure of tank #1; however, 
all of the other initiated failures propagate as well and are summed for the next step. It is thought 
that a seismic event causes only one tank failure as the initiating event.  
Finally, in step #5, the increase in incident frequency for each tank after a domino effect starts 
from any of the tank is used. Starting from each single-tank rupture, different propagations were 
considered and occasionally a propagation chain was shown to have a different number of 
fatalities because its impact area may be increased. However, the increase in fatalities is very 
small because the increase in the size of the fatality zone from the first and second domino 
Fig. 6. Example sequence of a domino effect starting from tank #1 
 
effects is not large owing to the proximity between tanks. The increased frequencies reflecting 
all event propagations were inserted into the Phast-Risk assessment.  
 
3. Results and discussions 
A catastrophic rupture frequency for a tank, i, is shown in eqn. (1), and is the sum of the generic 
rupture frequency and the rupture frequency from a seismic event at the province.   
 
S = 𝛼 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙  ×   P𝑙              eqn. (1)                   
              
where 𝛼 is the generic rupture frequency of 10−6/year, and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙 is the annual exceedance 
probability of the PGA at location l, and Pl is the tank rupture probability for the PGA. For 
instance, AEP is 5 × 10−7/year when the PGA is 0.85 g at the event location, as shown in Fig. 
5, and Pi is calculated as 50% using the PGA and the equation in Table 5 for a pressurized vessel. 
Considering the accumulated rupture frequencies from the domino effects caused from the 
ruptures of the nearby tanks, as listed in Fig 6, eqn. (2) shows how to calculate the overall 
frequency based on a domino effect starting from the rupture of a tank after a seismic event.     
 
𝐷𝑖  = ∑ �𝐴𝑗  × 𝑅𝑖𝑗� × (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙  ×  𝐴𝑙)3𝑗=1         eqn. (2) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑗 is the number of events in which tank i can be affected and ruptured by the jth domino 
effect when nearby tanks explode, and Ej is the propagation probability for the jth domino effect. 
The domino effect frequency, Di, is meaningful for a seismic event when j reaches 2, and thus 
the third and following domino effects are disregarded owing to their low frequency. Supposing 
that the domino propagation probability is 0.3, E1 is 0.3, and E2 is 0.09. E3 does not indicate the 
third domino effect, but rather the case in which a tank near a ruptured tank initially survives the 
first domino effect but is affected by the second domino effect. Here, E3 is calculated as 0.063. 
For instance, tank #2 in Fig. 6 will not be affected by the first domino effect even though it is 









All those event numbers are presented in Table 6 where Rij are extracted from.  
Table 6. Event numbers of ordinal domino effect per tank (Rij) 
Table 7 shows the total rupture frequencies for each tank from a domino effect initiating from a 
seismic event. As shown, tank #4 has the highest rupture frequency because its location is at the 
center, and is vulnerable to be affected by the explosions of the surrounding tanks.  
Table 7. Frequency of domino events for each tank owing to a seismic event (E-06/year) 























A catastrophic rupture scenario of saturated liquid at 278.15 K for all tanks was also selected 
from Phast-Risk ver. 6.7. The population was assumed to be 8100 within an area of 2,639,939 m2. 
The fraction of the indoor population is 0.1, and that of the outdoor population is 0.9. Owing to 
an immediate ignition, explosions are assumed to be 30% of the catastrophic rupture events, and 
the other 70% are the consequences of a flash fire. The vulnerability of people in an indoor area 
to a flash fire is assumed to be 10%, and is 100% for people outdoors. A total of 18 wind 
directions were properly input based on their probabilities using a wind rose for more than a 30-
year period at a nearby airport, as shown in Table 8; in addition, for the weather conditions, a 1.5 
m/s wind speed and air stability class F (stable) were chosen, as in the previous QRA study, for a 
conservative approach. The distances between tanks are shown in Table 9. Calculated for the 
tank, BLEVE, 3 barg of overpressure is observed for up to 45 m, and no tank is farther than 28 m 
from another tank, as shown in the table, which means an explosion from a tank should affect the 
nearby tanks. For the domino effect, the tanks are located quite close to each other, making it 
unlikely for them to be unaffected if an explosion occurs at a nearby tank.  







350-10 8.4 110-130 4.4 230-250 3.3 
10-30 11.2 130-150 5.9 250-270 2.3 
30-50 8.7 150-170 6.3 270-290 2.8 
50-70 4.8 170-190 5.1 290-310 5.4 
70-90 3.9 190-210 4.4 310-330 8.2 




 Event number  
Tank # (i) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
E1  3 6 3 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 
E2 7 4 7 9 9 4 4 4 4 5 5 
E3  4 12 4 10 10 12 12 6 6 4 4 
Table 9. Distance matrix for the center of one tank to the center of another tank (m) 
 
Inputting all frequencies, process conditions, and weather conditions, the yellow FN curve 
shown in Fig. 7 appears. The blue line is the original FN curve, which does not consider either a 
seismic or a domino effect. The yellow line, in contrast, includes all factors. Fig. 7 explicitly 
shows that a difference mainly occurs for the frequency. For the consequences, however, the 
numbers of fatalities do not differ owing to the limitation of the program, which counts each tank 
rupture independently such that the maximum value of N is always the same. In fact, there 
should be little difference in the numbers of fatalities because the tanks are so close to each other 
that the fatality zones are similar and overlap.   
 
  
Tank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 - 25 50 32 52 56 70 77 90 24 47 
2 - - 25 31 34 52 56 75 78 34 31 
3 - - - 46 31 61 52 82 76 54 28 
4 - - - - 28 23 39 46 57 56 62 
5 - - - - - 31 24 51 46 67 55 
6 - - - - - - 28 22 37 78 83 
7 - - - - - - - 36 23 89 79 
8 - - - - - - - - 28 101 105 
9 - - - - - - - - - 110 103 
10 - - - - - - - - - - 38 
Fig. 7. Comparison of FN curves 
Red line: maximum risk criteria  
Sky blue line: minimum risk criteria 
Blue line: original FN curve  
Yellow line: FN curve considering a domino effect from a seismic event 
 
Conclusion 
Events and accidents related to multiple units in the nuclear and chemical industry have been 
explored because too many units with a substantial hazard risk are foreseen to be more 
dangerous than in a plant with fewer units or only one. Therefore, this study attempted to 
determine how risks could differ between the original QRA study and a QRA study that 
considers a seismic event and a subsequent domino effect, particularly when there are too many 
large-sized tanks located very close at a particular site. The frequency of seismic events for a 
certain LPG storage location in South Korea was applied, along with the weather conditions and 
population. Phast-Risk ver. 6.7 was employed to swiftly generate FN curves for a seismic event 
combined with a domino effect. Definitive increments in frequency were observed in the FN 
curve when compared with the original FN curve without a domino effect. This research can help 
the nuclear industry as solid evidence indicating that multi-unit plants have a higher risk than 
single-unit plants, which lack the possibility of a direct domino event.  
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